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1. Introduction and scope.
The purpose of this paper is twofold: (a) To analyze the effect of
some common agricultural programs on the planted area of a crop. This will
be done within the framework of a simple model mostly by graphical methods.
(b) To comment on an estimative procedure by which a support price, which is
linked to acreage restrictions, is transformed to an “effective support price.”
Three programs will be analyzed, namely, unlinked support price, link
support price and diversion payment. The main features of these are as
follows.
1. Unlinked support price. The government announces a support price.
If the market price is lower than the announced price, the government com-
pensates the farmers for the difference. No acreage restrictions are imposed.
2. Linked support price. The government announces a support price
(which might be in addition to the unlinked support price) but in order to
be eligible for payments the farmer has to undertake some restrictions.
These are basically of two sorts: (a) An allotment of area which is permitted
to be planted with the crop under the program. (b) Diversion: the farmer is
not allowed to plant any crop on a certain definite area. A common version
of this is that the diverted area can be devoted to some soil conserving uses.
*The author was a Post Doctoral Fellow in the Department of Agricultural
and Applied Economics, University of Minnesota, and is currently Lecturer,
Department of Agricultural Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Rehovot,
Israel.2
Usually the acreage restrictions are allocated to the farmers according to
some proportion of the planted area at some basic period in the past. For




and the allotment is 80% of the basis, he will have an allotment
acres and diversion of 200 acres. (Under the present definition,
program allows the farmer to devote the 200 acres to another crop,
it is not a diversion.)
3. Diversion payments. Under this program the government announces
a diversion rate to be paid for diverted area. Sometimes there are minimal
and maximal limits for diversion.
The last two programs can be mandatory or voluntary. Only the voluntary
programs will be analyzed here.
2. The model.
The following is a very simple model of an individual farmer. The
objective is to assume the simplest model, which still can describe the
response of the farmer to the various programs in a rather general way. In
most cases the results can be generalized to more complicated cases in an
obvious way.
For simplicity, assume that there are two crops: one is the crop under
the program which is investigated, say “wheat” and the other represents an
1/ aggregate of all alternative crops,— Assume that the farmer has a total
area of A acres, which he has to allocate between “wheat” and “alternatives.”
&/The name “wheat” is applied here generally to the crop under considera-
tion only for convenience of writing. But the discussion is not restricted
to wheat. In fact some programs even did not include wheat in reality.3
Aw will denote the area allocated
For simplicity let us assume
with regard to prices and natural
to wheat and A= the area of alternatives.
that there is no subjective uncertainty
conditions, that is, each farmer assumes
that he knows for sure what will be the prices. However, different farmers
might have different expectations. This assumption is made in order to
avoid uncertainty which complicates the analysis of the individual farmer,
and at the same time to allow differences among farmers in their price
assessments.
Assume that thereare constant returns to scale in “wheat” (the crop
under consideration). This implies that for a given set of prices of wheat
and inputs the farmer can decide on the amount of inputs, yield and profit




decision on input-yield composition and the decision on scale are
Keeping all prices, except that of “wheat”, constant, the net
acre of “wheat” is an Increasing function of “wheat” price only,
which will be denoted by:
7r(P)
such that: IT’(P)> 0
Further, assume that thereare decreasing returns to scale in the alter-
native crop. With all prices constant, total net income from the alternative
crop is an increasing function of the area planted under this crop, with
a diminishing marginal productivity. Denote the net income of the alternative
crop as a function of its area by
+ (Aa)
such that: @’(Aa) > 0 and +“(Aa) < 0.
Total net income from both “wheat” and alternatives will be denoted by +I)= $@a) + n(P) l Aw
In a free market, the farmer will grow Am acres of “wheat” (~ - Am
of alternative), where the marginal net incomes of wheat and alternative
are equal, and total net income is maximal.
Figure 1 describes the “free market” allocation: total area X is
represented by the distance OwOa. Any point along OwOa represents alloca-
tion between “wheat” (measured from left to right) and alternative (measured
from right to left). Suppose that the farmer assesses that the market price
will be Pm. Then net income per acre of wheat w~ll be T(pm) (see upper
section of figure 1). Total income from “wheat” as a function of its planted
area is described by Owb in the lower section of figure 1. The net income
function of alternative, +(Aa) is depicted by the curve Oac in the lower




Total net income for each allocation is derived by a vertical
of the “wheat” and alternative net income curves (curve cb in
section of fig. 1). Maximal net income is $m, obtained at
allocation Am, where the marginal curves intersect (point g in the upper
section).
Suppose now, that for some reason, the market price as expected by
the farmer, increased from 1? to P’. Net income per acre of wheat is now
?r(P’) (higher than ?T(P’’’)). The dashed curves of figure 1 describe the new
situation, which results in increasing “wheat” area from OwAm to OwA~
(decreasing the area of alternative from OaAm to OaA’). In this manner a
curve which describes “wheat” area as a function of prices can be derived.
Generally, such a curve has a positive slope like the curve in figure 2.
Let us now analyze the effect of the above mentioned agricultural
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response will be investigated first and then the aggregate industry.
3. Analysis of some agricultural programs.
3.1. Unlinked support price.
The program was described in section 1. The acreage response of an
individual farmer to the expected market price was derived in section 2
(see figure 2). When the announced support price is higher than the expected
market price, the farmer would extend his “wheat” area, following the same
curve as in figure 2. Suppose, that he expects Pm to be the market price,
so that without the program he would plant Am acres of “wheat”. His “wheat”
area as a function of variable support price is identical to that portion
of the curve in figure 2, which is to the right of Am (see figure 3).
Notice that different producers might have different assessments on
market price, and therefore have a different critical level of support
price, above which they will change their “wheat” acreage. The industry
curve of “wheat” area as a function of unlinked support price can be derived
by a horizontal summation of the individuals’ curves. It is obvious that
in total an unlinked support price has a positive effect on “wheat” acreage.
3.2. Linked support price.
Denote the linked support price by PLS, the diverted area by Ads
and the area permitted to be planted under “wheat” by As. The farmer has
the option to “buy” the whole package of support price with the acreage
restriction or to stay outside the program. The comparison between the two
possibilities is demonstrated in figure 4. The nonparticipation case is
identical to the free market cas~and the relevant net income curves of
“wheat”, of alternative crop and in total are Owb, Oac and bc respectively,
as in figure 1 above. The marginal curves of “wheat” and alternative are6
?r(Pm)gand ef respectively. Am is the optimal allocation with maximal
net income of Im. The situation under the program is described by the dashed
ds
curves in figure 4. The farmer must divert A of his land so instead of
ds
a crop area of OwOa he is allowed to plant only ~ , the difference 1s A ,
LS the diverted area. Assuming that the support price P = P’ is higher than
the expected market price Pm, the net income per acre of “wheat” is now
n(P’), which is higher than I’r(pm). The total net income curve of “wheat”
is O b’ and the marginal curve is ~(P’)g’ in the upper section. The total
w
and marginal net income curves, of the alternative crop are obtained from
the nonparticipation ones by shifting these curves to the left by an amount
ds equal to A . (See Oa’c’ and=in figure 4.) The
ds
a support price P’ and diverted area A is obtained
the dashed marginal curves intersect (g’ in the upper
highest net income with
by allocation A’, where
section). Total net
income with this allocation is 0’, which is the maximal point of the total
net income curve b’c’. Let us first analyze the case where the only acreage
restriction is diversion (no maximal “wheat” area). If the linked support
and
price is high enough~the net income under the program is higher than outside,
the farmer will participate. Otherwise he will not. It should be noted
that when there are no restrictions on maximal “wheat” area, the “wheat”
area under participation may be greater or smaller than the nonparticipation
area, depending on the level of the support price and the amount of diversion.
Let us now analyze the effect of increasing the linked support price P ,
LS
keeping the diverted area constant. For low values of P
LS
the farmer will ,
not participate and will allocate his land according to Am, the “free market”
LS allocation. At some level of P he will be indifferent whether to participate
or not. Above this he will participate and as the support price continues to
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in figure 4 which corresponds to a higher support price P“. (The best
allocation now is A“), One can draw a curve which describes “wheat”
acreage as a function of the linked support price, given the amount of
LS diversion. Notice that at the indifference level of P , “wheat” area might
be either smaller or greater than Am, the nonparticipation area. The first
case is demonstrated in figure 5 and the second one in figure 6 (in
these figures Am is the nonparticipation “wheat” acreage, A1 is the wheat
acreage at the indifference price support level, Pi).
Consider now the effect of the linked support price on total acreage
of the whole “wheat” industry. Each farmer might have different indifference
levelsof price support, As PLS increases, more and more farmers participate
and “jump” to the acreage at their indifference level. Now, if the indif-
ference acreage is greater than the nonparticipation acreage (figure 6),
LS then in total,’’wheat” acreage increases with P . However, if for the
individuals the acreage at the indifference support price is smaller than
the nonparticipation acreage,
is not a priori unique, since
planting when theyfirst enter
acreage when they are already
the direction of change in total wheat acreage
part of the farmers reduce their “wheat”
the program, others will increase their
inside the program.
Continuingto assume no maximal acreage restriction, let us an=b= the
effect of changing the diversion restriction, keeping the price support level
constant. Figure 7 is similar to figure 4 with the addition of the dotted
curves, which represent an increase of the diverted area from OaO& to OaOu .
Pm is the expected market price, PLS is the linked support price, Am the
nonparticipation allocation, A’ the original participation allocation (when
diversion is OaO~ ) and A“ the allocation after further increase of diversion.
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diverted area results in reducing “wheat” acreage, This is true for every
given support price, so in terms of figures 5 and 6 this means a shift of
the acreage-support price curve to the left (i.e., for each support price,
“wheat” area is smaller). In addition, total net income at the best allo-
cation decreases when diversion increases (compare V“ with v’ in figure 7)
so at some level of diversion, given the support price, the farmer will be
indifferent whether to participate in the program or to withdraw. Notice
also, that at the indifference level of diversion, “wheat” acreage might
be either smaller or greater than the nonparticipation acreage, so that when
the farmer leaves the program his “wheat” area might be increased or decreased.
For a given support price? a curve which describes “wheat” acreage for
different diversion levels is drawn ip ftgqres 8 and 9 which correspond to
the case of smaller and greater indifference acreage respectively. In
these figures Am is the nonparticipation acreage, A1 is the acreage at the
dI indifference level of diversion A .
The industry “wheat” acreage as a function of the diversion restriction
is obtained by summing the individuals’ functions. As with the function of
support price, the slope of the curve of acreage against diversion might
be negative, as an increase of the diversion restriction makes the partici-
pants reduce their land allocation to “wheat”, and as more and more farmers
whose indifference acreage is greater than the nonparticipation acreage
leave the program. However, it might be the case that the nonparticipation
acreage is greater than the indifference acreage and in this case the slope
of the industry wheat acreage as a functzon of the diversion level might be
positive.
All the last discussion can be summarized graphically as follows. Let
LS us draw iso-income curves in the (P , Ads) plane, i.e., all the combina-
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income. It is obvious that such an iso-income curve has a positive slope.
Some iso-income curves are drawn in figure 10, denoted by $’, $“, $’”, such
that 4’” represents income greater than ~“, greater than ~’, etc. One of
these iso-income curves represents net income which is equal to the nonparti-
cipation income, i.e., it is the combinations of support prices and diversion
areas at which the farmer is indifferent as to whether or not to participate
in the program. This iso-income curve is denoted by Vm in figure 10. Since
all the combinations below and to the right of *m are inferior to IJJm and all
which are above and to the left of Ym are superior to $m, Vm itself is the
indifference combinations of PLS and Ads
.
In a similar way, one can draw an iso-acreage curve which indictitesthe
combinations of support-prices and diversions which result in the same “wheat”
acreage under participation. LS The slope of an iso-acreage curve in the (P ,
ds A ) plane is also positive. A whole “map” of iso-acreage curves is drawn
in figure 11 designated by A’, A“, A’”...to indicate increasing acreage
(A’ < A“ < A’” ... etc.) One of the iso-acreage curves correspondsto the
nonparticipation acreage and is denoted in figure 11 by Am. Note that Am
ds ,. . .. and $m reach the P .. ..- –. .nl
Let us combine
in the same figure.
axis ac me same polnr, lee., ar r .
the two “maps” of iso-income and Iso-acreage together
Generally, two cases are possible.
Case 1. The slope of the iso-acreage curves is greater than the slope of
the iso-income curve. This case is depicted in figure 12. In
this case the indifference acreage is smaller than the nonpartici-
pation acreage. As a result, when the support price is just above
the indifference level the farmer will reduce his acreage when he






































FIGURE 14 FIGURE 1510
LS whole industry might increase or decreases P increases.
Similarly, total acreage might increase or decrease as the
diversion restriction increases.
Case 2. The slope of the iso-acreage curves is smaller than the slope of
the iso-income curves (figure 13). In this case the results are
LS ds
unique: an increase of P and a decrease of A result in an
increase of total “wheat” acreage.
So far, it has been assumed that there are no maximal “wheat” acreage
constraints. Let us introduce this restriction to the analysis. The only
interesting case is of course, the case in which this restriction might be
effective, i.e., when the linked support price and diversion are such that
the farmer chooses to participate in the program. Such a caee was presented
by the dashed curves in figure 4 above, where Pm and P’ are the expected
market price and linked support price, respectively, Am is the nonpartici-
pation allocation of land, A’ the allocation when support price is P’ and
diversion is Ads .~ where there is no maximal acreage restriction. a a’
~m is the maximal net income with nonparticipation and V’ is the maximal net
income under participation when there is no maximal acreage restriction.
Let us denote the minimal land allocation under participation that gives at
least the nonparticipation net income (Vm) by ~ (see figure 4). It is
ds obvious that given P’ and A , if the maximal acreage allotment As is less
than & the farmer will not participate in the program and will allocate
his land according to Am. As As, the “wheat” acreage allotment, increases
above ~ he will participate and plant As of wheat (~ - Ads - As of alterna-
tive crop) until As is equal to A’, the allocation of land in a program with
no allotment restriction. Above A’ the maximal acreage restriction is not11
effective since the farmer would not exceed A’ anyway.
For a given linked support price PLS and diversion restriction, one can
plot the farmer’s “wheat” acreage against the allotment. In the effective
range (i.e., between ~ and A’) the slope of this curve would be 45°. As in
the analysis of PLS ds
and of A , here also, the indifference allotment ~ might
be either less than or greater than the nonparticipation acreage. The two
cases are plotted in figures 14 and 15 respectively.
The effect of increasing the maximal “wheat” acreage allotment on the
aggregate acreage cannot be signed a priori. In the case that the allotment
of indifference for the individuals is smaller than the nonparticipation
acreage, an increase of the maximum acreage constraint will cause more and
more individuals to join the program and reduce their “wheat” planting.
However those who have already participated will increase their acreage.
3.3. Diversion payments.
Assume that a diversion payment is added to a linked support price,
which was analyzed above, i.e., the government offers to pay the partici-
pants for the diverted area. Suppose that the rate is Rd dollars per acre,
ds total payment is D = Rd - A ds , where A is the area which the farmer has
to divert if he participates in the program. In terms of figure 4 the effect
can be described by shifting the net income curve of the alternative crop,
Oat’, and the total net income curve, b’c’ upwards by an amount equal to D.
However, this diversion payment is a lump sum so it does not affect the
marginal curves (upper section of figure 4) and therefore the optimal allo-
cation of land under participation in the program is not changed. On the
other hand, the profitability of participation does change, that is, the
indifference levels of the linked support price, of the allotment constraint12
and of the diversion restriction, change as the diversion payment increases.
In terms of figures 10, 12 and 13, each iso-income curve now represents
higher net income than or’lginally, by the amount of diversion payment D.
In particular, the iso-income curve which corresponds to the nonparticipa-
tion income shifts downwards, which means that the indifference conditions
of support price and diversion shift towards lower support price and greater
diversion.
Recall that there are two possible cases with regard to “wheat” acreage
at the indifference state.
Case 1. The indifference acreage is smaller than the nonparticipation
acreage.
Case 2. The indifference acreage is greater. In case 1, the effect of
raising the diversion payment on total aggregative “wheat” acreage
is negative while in case 2 it is positive.
Note that a special case of the general linkedsupportprice with diver-
sion payment is when the support price is zero, that is the only payment is
the diversion payment. In this case the optimal land allocation to “wheat”
under participation is always smaller than the nonparticipation acreage.
It follows that raising the diversion rate causes more and more individuals
to join the program and to reduce their “wheat” planting, so that the
aggregative acreage decreases.
The diversion payment discussed above was conditioned on a fixed
diverted area, and as such was considered as a lump sum. Assume now that
a fixed rate per acre is offered to variable amounts of diverted area. To
analyze this case, let us relax the assumption of constant returns to scale13
in “wheat” and assume the usual assumption of diminishing marginal produc-
tivity of land. For each expected market price, Pm, the marginal net income
of “wheat” area is negatively sloped instead of being a horizontal line in
the previous discussion. This curve is denoted by n(Pm) in figure 16, in
which the marginal net income curve of alternative crop is drawn from left
to right and is denoted by $’. The “market price” allocation of land is at
the intersection of the two marginal curves, Am in figure 16. If a




the “market price” then the optimal land allocation is such that Rd = m = $’.
figure 16, the land allocation for a diversion rate Rd is: O#w acres
“wheat”, OaAa acres of alternative crop, and diversion of AwAa. By raising
~d, the diverted area increases
area of the alternative crop).
decreasing function of Rd.
To summarize this section,
programs has been analyzed. In
while “wheat” area decreases (as well as the
The aggregative “wheat” acreage is also a
the acreage response to some agricultural
two unlinked programs, namely, support
price and diversion payment, the effect of changing in the parameters of
the program on the acreage of the crop under consideration could be uniquely
signed. However, in the linked program the direction of change in “wheat”
acreage, in response to changes in the linked support price, or in the
allotment or in the diversion restriction cannot a priori be determined.
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4. Some comments on “effective support price.”
In the last few years, several articles have been published in which
price-acreage relationships of various grain crops were estimated under
conditions of support price and acreage restrictions (Houck and Mann (1968)
[1], Houck and Subotnik (1969) [2], Houck and Ryan (1972) [3], Ryan and Abel
(1972 and 1973) [4, 5, 6]). In these articles, the notion of an “effective
support price” was introduced. This variable was supposed to represent the
effect of both the support price and the various acreage constraints. Such a
summarizing variable might be useful for prediction and for policy analysis
if a proper method to estimate it is available. In what follows it is aimed
to clarify some theoretical points concerning the “effective support price”
and to comment on the theoretical background of its empirical estimation.
It is best to describe the whole matter by quoting one of the articles
mentioned above, e.g., Houck and Subotnik (1969) [2]:
Theoretical Model of
Effective Support
Let a simple acreage supply function be
representedby
Price supporx programs foranumber ofirn- (ql) A=aO+alP
portantcrops in U.S. agriculture involvea
guaranteedmhtimumsupportpricein returnfor where A is theharvested acreageand Pis the
which partic@adngfarmers agree to reduce relevant supply-inducing price. Allothersupply
acreagerelative tosomehistorfcally established 6hifters are heldfixed and incorporated in ao.
base. The guaranteed minimum price mayln-
clude several elements--the basic price sup-
port loan rate, adirect payment based onpar-
ticipation level, and adirect payment basedon
production from permitted acreage under the
program. It is clear, therefore, that supply
analyses which utilize only the baelc support
rate for several compedng commodities will be
less useful than those into which the mandatory
or voluntary acreage restrictions imposed on
farmers canbe incorporate&
Oneapproachto tbisquesdonofincorporating
both price support and acreage restrictions ina
supply analysis involves the weightingor “nor-
malizadon” of announced supprtratea bymeans
of the acreage restrictions imposed onpartici-
padng farmers. For this discussion, a rather
simple analytical framework is developed. A
















Assume now that a support price ps is offered
to the farmers only if they are willing to reduce
acreage to A ~ compared to A1 which wohld be
harvested without restriction at p‘. This is
shown in figure 1. The price pf is that which
would induce farmers to hold acreage at A2with.
out restrictions. For this discussion, pf is
called the “effective supportprice” and is the
alternative cost of committing A2 to this corn.
modfty. This effective support rate is the vari.
able which will be taken into account byfarmera
in planning production patterna among alternative
crop enterprises.
The announced support rate ps may be higher
thanpfbecausepolicy makers wishtomaintain
farm incomeabovethelevel whichwouldoccur
under pf(areaco infigure1).This addedin-
come fs onlyavailable to farmers when their
acreage is held at A2. 3
For analytical purposes, it is useful to find a
function which transforms ps into p f by nor-
malizing or deflating the announced support rate,
Consider equation (1) evaluated at two points,





This relationship implies that
A2. ~
(q3) Pf = –—P ‘
A1-~
If a.= O or is smallrelattve toA2 andA], then
(q4) pf =(A?/A!) ps
In this case, the effective support rate can be
expressedas a function of announcedsupport
rateand a ratio ofthepermitted tothedesired
acreage.Where no ac cage remrlcdons are
employed, p8 and p f are identical since
(~ /A1 ) =1.
of
be
It is not entirely clear from the quotation what is
the curve in figure ql and in particular what is A2.
useful to interpret it in a somewhat more formal way.
the exact meaning
Therefore, it might
Let us denote the
maximal allotment constraint by As (As can be expressed in terms of total
area, or as a ratio of the allotment to some basic area). Generally, given
all other shifters of the supply function, the planted area, A, is a function
s
of both the support price, Ps, and the allotment constraint, A . Denote this
function, generally by
A= f (Ps, As).16
An interpretation of the curve in the figure is that it is the aggrega-
tive acreage response of a crop to the support price when thereare no acreage
restrictions, i.e., to an unlinked support-price. Formally, denoting the
last function by g(Ps), it is defined by
g(Ps) E f(Ps, ‘=).
where ~ indicates an acreage restriction
ineffective.
What is A2 in the quoted figure 2?
identical to the acreage restriction As.
which is sufficiently large to be
One possibility is that A2 is
This interpretation is useless,
f
since P , if defined accordingly, does not indicate (through the function
g(P)) what will be the planted area, A, which is the objective of the
procedure. Thus, A* (and accordingly Pf) should be interpreted not as the
allotment but as the planted area which results from the support price Ps and
allotment As, that is
A2 E f(Ps, As)
The definition of Pf in this case is
Pf z g-l[f(Ps, As)]
-1 where g is the inverse of g (assuming g is monotonic).
Let us use additional notation, which was also used in the recent
articles of the above list. Define the “weight” by which Ps is transformed
to Pf by r, i.e.:
It should be noted that the last formula is nothing more than an identity
which defines r. r is said to be’’theadjustment factor expressing the
acreage restrictions in the program”. (Houck and Ryan (1972) [ 3]).17
However, generally, r is not a function of only the acreage restrictions but
also of the support price itself:
r .ih!x.u
Ps
In fact, the analysis of linked price in section 3 above shows that
the effect of As depends on the level of Ps. For example, the indifference
allotment, i.e., the level of allotment at which an individual farmer decides
to participate, decreases with Ps. The higher Ps is, the stronger the posi-
tive effect of increasing As on the aggregative acreage would be. So, r is
not a pure function of the restrictions. Changing the support price, Ps,
affects Ps directly, and also “indirectly” through r.
The authors of the quoted articles suggest a procedure to estimate r
in a given year, which is based on a ratio of the allotment to some base
acreage. In this way, they adjust Ps and estimate Pf. The estimated Pf
is then used as data in the estimation of the g function (i.e., a + alP o
in the quotation). In view of the fact that ;, the estimated r, is based
only on the allotment, at least the theoretical background of this procedure
seems to be poor. However, it should
obtained when using this procedure in
tions of various grains. The lack of
calls for additional investigation to
be noted that good results were
empirical estimations of supply equa-
sufficient theoretical background





is important especially if one intends to use the
and in policy analysis. A theory is needed which
A





casting, one must verify
example, one may want to
which proved good in analyzing past data, in fore-
that the basic conditions do not change. For
predict the effect of increasing the allotment.18
To do that, he has to estimate the new ;, to calculate Pf and to insert it
into the “supply” equation A = g(P). Using the procedure described above,
A
r is estimated only by the allotment, which means that the same “weight”
is applied to every support price. However, theoretically at least, it
has been shown in section 3 that the effect of the linked support price on
the aggregative planted acreage depends on the level of restrictions and
this level might even change the direction of the price effect.
This brings us to another point. In calculating Pf, no distinction
was made between linked and
erroneous since it has been
is different and even might
unlinked support price Ps. This seems to be
shown (section 3) that the effect on acreage
be different in direction.19
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